Subjective Alienation and Mob Violence in Coriolanus, Julius Caesar, and 2 Henry VI
In his treatise The Right to the City, written and published in Paris just before the student riots of 1968, Henri Lefebvre claims that inhabitants of an urban space have a 'right to the city' which supersedes the rights of property owners and advocates re-appropriation of the city, resulting in 'collective ownership and management of space'. 1 This transformation requires 'activation and mobilization of inhabitants', spurred on by a vision of an 'urgent utopia'. 2 In 1968, Lefebvre was a lecturer at the University of Nanterre, the epicentre of the unrest; he gave a class to two-thousand-odd students on modernity and everyday life, and his radical proposals seem to have inspired many of his students to take direct action. In an interview, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the student leaders, described him as a 'wonderful lecturer'. 3 'He would seduce everybody', Cohn-Bendit recalled, 'just talk, telling anecdotes; he loved to talk and everybody loved his classes'. 'I didn't really know him personally', he explained; 'I was only one of many students in the audience. But his ideas on cultural Stadt network (rechtaufstadt.net); and, in the United States, the Right to the City Alliance (righttothecity.org). 5 In one of his earliest plays, 2 Henry VI, Shakespeare presents what seems, at least, to be a nightmare, dystopian counterpoint to Lefebvre's dream. In his representation of the Jack Given the intrinsic imperfections of human nature, the best possible outcome of class conflict, as Shakespeare sees it, is neither tyranny, oligarchy, nor mob rule --still less, an implausible Marxist utopia --but instead an uneasy balance of power. As James Madison explains, in his celebrated defence of the American constitution, 'Ambition must be made to counteract ambition'. Fear of the breakdown of civic order on the part of the aristocracy, coupled with fear of punishment on the part of the commoners, allows each class to restrain the potential excesses of the other. The king for his part keeps them unified, at least in theory, both as a talisman and as a power broker. In the popular imagination, the king serves as an imagined court of appeal for the claims of the poor against the injustices of the rich.
Likewise, the king himself is kept in check by the watchful eye of the nobility. 'It may be a reflection on human nature, ' Madison muses, 'that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary'. 10 
The Politics of Recognition
In the early 1990s, proponents of the politics of recognition began to argue that alongside material or economic deprivation, there is an additional, more powerful force driving social and political struggle: the desire for recognition. The starting-point of this 'politics of recognition' is Hegel's dialectic of the development of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. At the beginning of the section on lordship and bondage, Hegel posits that 'self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged'. 11 Charles Taylor re-articulates this argument in his seminal essay, 'The Politics of Recognition'; as he explains there, 'the genesis of the human mind is … not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical'. Taylor's revival of Hegel set the stage for a more pervasive move which extends the application of Hegel's dialectic to a wide field of social groups. 12 'A number of strands in contemporary politics', Taylor writes, 'turn on the need, sometimes the demand for recognition'. As examples of social movements driven by this desire, he draws attention more specifically to nationalism, feminism, and multiculturalism. 13 Advocates of these positions want something more than money or even legal powers of coercion: their more fundamental aim is for their narrative, their sense of themselves, to be respected. They want, in other words, a subjective change in the way they are perceived, alongside, emerging out of, but distinct from, any more objective economic reparations or institutional reform.
Writing around the same time, Francis Fukuyama and Axel Honneth place recognition at the centre not just of contemporary social struggle, but of the whole of human societal development. The desire for recognition, according to Fukuyama, is 'the motor of history'. 14 'As interpreted by Alexandre Kojève', he writes, 'Hegel provides us with an alternative "mechanism" by which to understand the historical process, one based on the 'struggle for recognition'. 15 Likewise for Honneth, 'motives for social resistance and rebellion are formed in the context of moral experiences stemming from the violation of deeply rooted expectations regarding recognition'. 16 Honneth sees recognition as fundamental to the development of history: 'It is by way of the morally motivated struggles of social groupstheir collective attempt to establish, institutionally and culturally, expanded forms of reciprocal recognition -that the normatively directional change of societies proceeds'. 17 Turning back to Shakespeare for a moment, it is perhaps for this reason, the desire for recognition, that the plebeians in Coriolanus speak of their 'voices', rather than their 'votes'.
Coriolanus baulks at the custom that those running for consul must petition the citizens in public for their acceptance. As one of the tribunes, Brutus, recalls, I heard him swear
Were he to stand for consul, never would he Appear i'th' market-place nor on him put
The napless vesture of humility,
Nor showing, as the manner is, his wounds
To th' people, beg their stinking breaths. (2.1.225-29)
As the other tribune, Sicinius, is quick to remind him, however, 'Sir, the people / Must have their voices, neither will they bate / One jot of ceremony' (2.2.138-9). 18 Conversation is integral to immediate, everyday intersubjective recognition, and it is for this reason that the citizens set such store by it. The 'voice' is a more visceral representation of the self than a 'vote'. In his Politics, Aristotle singles out language as proof that man is inextricably social:
'that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident,' he writes; "nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech' (1.2).
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From the perspective of Hegelian political philosophy, the traditional process of standing for consul which Coriolanus must endure in the marketplace amounts to a straightforward swap, so to speak, of interpersonal respect. He is to show the scars of his battle-wounds to all and sundry, and in exchange, in light of his evident military service, they will support his standing for consul. 26 He draws an explicit parallel between the two movements: 'In March 1871 as in May 1968, people who had come from the outlying areas into which they had been driven and where they had found nothing but a social void assembled and proceeded together toward the reconquest of the urban centers'. 27 These moments are exceptional, however. More typically, Lefebvre explains, the proletariat has become 'dispensable', consigned to 'peripheral enclaves for dispersed enterprises'. The 'working class, victim of segregation', has been 'expelled from the traditional city, deprived of a present and possible urban life'. 28 In its most basic sense, the right to the city means the right of those who work there to live there, as well, and to spend their leisure time there. In Lefebvre's terms, it is the right of those who use the city to inhabit the city. In its more comprehensive sense, however, the right to the city is political and social:
it mandates that all classes, even the poorest, should be able to participate equally in the "life" of a city, a collective 'oeuvre' akin to a work of art. 29 As Lefebvre sees it, 'to exclude the urban from groups, classes, individuals, is also to exclude them from civilization, if not from society itself. The right to the city legitimates the refusal to allow oneself to be removed from urban reality by a discriminatory and segregative organization'. 
4: Objective Alienation
Shakespeare's representation of urban riots and peasant rebellion almost entirely contradicts Lefebvre's more optimistic vision, even at the cost of some distortion to the historical record. According to the Tudor historian Raphael Holinshed, one of Shakespeare's chief sources, the rebel leader Jack Cade was 'right pregnant of wit', 'sober in talke' and 'wise in reasoning', even if he was also 'arrogant in hart, and stiffe in opinion'. 43 Historically, he sought to rein in the corruption of the king's counsellors and advisors, rather than to take action against the king himself. In Southwark his conduct was that of 'prohibiting to all his retinue, murder, rape, and robberie; by which colour of well meaning, he the more allured to him the harts of the common people.' 44 In 51 The other main cause of riots was the practice of 'enclosure'. As Alan Everitt explains, 'important though the labourer's individual smallholding was, the vital factor in his fortunes was his rights of common', especially 'his grazing rights on common pastures'.
Other crucial goods dependent on these traditional privileges included stone, coal, peat, firewood, timber, game, fish, fruit, herbs, and berries. 'Poor though they seem, these rights alone added a few simple graces to an otherwise bare existence, and bred in the labourer a sense of hope and independence'. As Everitt notes, however, 'Such an economy was peculiarly vulnerable … to the new economic forces of the period'. 52 In the years comprising it is, strictly speaking, legal. In both cases, the exchange value of a space to property owners is allowed to supersede its use value to would-be inhabitants, prompting indignation and violent resistance. The deprivation which provokes working-class riot and rebellion in Shakespeare's plays is not merely material, however, but also emotional. As Yves-Marie
Bercé explains, 'The trigger of revolt is not destitution, but injustice -and not objective injustice, but the conviction of it.' 55 Shakespeare's mobs are responding to insult, as well as injury; their violence is not so much a calculated tactic as it is a more visceral reaction to their sense of being subjected to high-handed contempt. In other words, they are responding to subjective as well as objective alienation. And on this point, the signal importance of subjective alienation, as distinct from objective, Shakespeare and Lefebvre share some important common ground.
5: Subjective Alienation
In marked contrast to the orthodox or, as he called it, 'dogmatic' Marxism of his day,
--the 'party line', literally, coming out of the Soviet Union --Lefebvre was at pains to insist that the alienation of the working class was more than merely economic. Until the late 1950s,
Lefebvre was a member of the French Communist Party, which at that time, in keeping with its staunch defence of Stalinism, posited a clear distinction between 'early' and 'late' Marx.
Marx's early works were seen as tainted by Hegelian idealism, too humanist and too philosophical, whereas his later works were cast as more reliably materialist and economic:
'scientific'. 56 Lefebvre in contrast advocated a holistic reading of Marx, one that in time led him to break ties with the Party. 'The fact that economic science and political action had superseded speculative philosophy fostered the false conclusion', he complained, 'that Marx had abandoned any conception of the philosophical world'. There is 'alienation in leisure just as in work'. 61 Lefebvre attributes much of the subjective alienation of everyday life to individuals' objective relation in space. In being pushed out of the urban centre, the common man is deprived, not only of potential economic gain, but also of the shared social and political life necessary to become a complete or what Lefebvre calls a 'total' human being. 'The total man', Lefebvre writes, 'is "de-alienated" man'. 'Human alienation will end with "the return of man to himself", that is to say in the unity of all the elements of the human'. 62 As Andy
Merrifield explains, 'the total man represents a goal, an ideal, a possibility, not a historical fact; it may never become an actual fact'. 63 however, it is the result of a more subjective change: the loss of 'that feeling of right, integrity, and honour which comes from supporting oneself by one's own activity and work'.
'Poverty in itself', he argues, 'does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, against government, etc.' ( § 244A).
For Hegel, poverty has 'a subjective aspect' which 'requires subjective help, both with regard to the particular circumstances and with regard to emotion and love' ( § 242). Using 'direct means' to 'maintain the increasingly impoverished mass at its normal standard of living' is not enough; instead, the poor need something that gives them a 'feeling of selfsufficiency and honour' ( § 245). That is to say, simply handing out welfare checks is not an adequate or advisable solution to the problem of poverty, as Hegel sees it. In addition, the poor need to feel that they are participants in civil society, part of a political unity. They need to feel invested in a common good like that described by Lefebvre when he speaks of the urban life of a city as an oeuvre, a collective work of art. Ritual recognition of the fellow humanity of the masses; public engagement acknowledging their co-existence; these simple, largely symbolic gestures serve as the proverbial 'sop to Cerberus', preventing popular agitation against the existing political order. We today may be inclined, like Lefebvre, to see working-class riot and rebellion as heroic. For Shakespeare, however, this kind of mob violence is a social ill, akin to civil war.
6: Hegel's Politics
In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel lays out the structure of a political state designed, among other things, to prevent the subjective alienation of the poor -although his notorious hostility to democracy may at first suggest otherwise. 72 In Hegel's system, the sovereign comprises not only the hereditary monarch, but also individuals who hold 'the highest advisory offices' ( § § 280, 283). These advisors submit proposals to the monarch, which he then ratifies ( § 283). Although technically, then, a constitutional monarchy, as Michael
Hardimon observes, in Hegel's proposed state, 'the real work of governing' is carried out not by the king, but by civil servants. 73 These positions, moreover, may be filled by anyone:
'knowledge and proof of ability' is the sole condition of appointment, which 'guarantees every citizen the possibility of joining' ( §291). In this limited sense, Hegel believes that anyone should be eligible to enter government.
What Hegel does not believe, however, is that everyone should play a part in the affairs of state, as all citizens do in a democracy, electing leaders on the basis of ideological platforms. Hegel believes such universal participation in government is ill-advised. 'The idea that everyone should participate in the concerns of the state entails the further assumption that everyone is an expert on such matters' ( §308R). Moreover, 'the electorate becomes indifferent in view of the fact that a single vote has little effect when numbers are so large' ( §311R). Given that relatively few people participate directly in government, alienation might easily set in; a danger Hegel acknowledges. The elected deputies that make their way into the legislative power do, however, have some influence in the formulation of policy. They are able to provide state officials with extra insight into 'the more urgent and specialized needs and deficiencies which they see in concrete form before their eyes' among the people they represent ( §301R). They 'uphold' the interests of the individual 'in an assembly which deals with universal issues' ( § 309R), and they 'participate' in the government's 'knowledge, deliberations, and decisions on matters of universal concern' ( § 314).
Nevertheless, the role of these elected deputies is not primarily to assist in governing.
'The highest officials within the state', Hegel argues, 'are able to do what is best even without the Estates, just as they must continue to do what is best when the Estates are in session' ( § 301R). Policy, again, in Hegel's system is formulated by civil servants, rather than elected representatives, and passed on to the monarch for approval, rather than the legislature.
The Estates serve primarily as a 'mediating organ', whose distinctive function is to ensure that 'the moment of formal freedom attains its right in relation to those members of civil society who have no share in government' ( § § 302, 314). That is to say, in plainer language, the core purpose of the Estates is not in fact to legislate at all, but instead to give the disenfranchised masses a feeling of connection to processes which they do not in any sense directly or even indirectly influence. To achieve this end, the Estates deputies participate in a 'forum for live exchanges and collective deliberations in which the participants [government officials and Estates deputies] instruct and convince one another' ( § 309). The aim of these exchanges is not to affect policy, but instead and more simply to help the public feel less alienated from their own government. 'The determination of the Estates as an institution does not require them to achieve optimum results in their deliberations and decisions on the business of the state in itself, for their role in this respect is purely accessory' ( §314).
Public debate of this kind, Hegel maintained in his lectures, would allow state powers to 'remain in touch' with public opinion and 'afford a great spectacle of outstanding educational value to the citizens' ( §315A). By 'ensuring that the power of the sovereign does not appear as an isolated extreme', the Estates in theory at least would prevent the public from becoming 'a massive power in opposition to the organic state' ( § 302). We may debate today the merits of this hypothetical safeguard against the danger of subjective alienation.
What Hegel shares with Lefebvre, however, as well as Shakespeare, is a sense of a potential problem. When the masses feel estranged from the authorities who handle the real business of government, mob violence is imminent. The excluded great unwashed, so to speak, are likely to reassert a balance of power through riot and rebellion, if only to recover their own sense that they are recognized as worthy of respect.
Riot and Rebellion
Like Shakespeare, Hegel singles out Rome as a place where the poor, being excluded altogether from the political processes of their own state, were allowed to degenerate into what he describes as a 'corrupt rabble' ( § 357) In the late Republic and early Empire, the common people were increasingly shut out of any meaningful political participation. The poor could not obtain redress of their grievances, including especially an end to recurrent food shortages. 74 As P. A. Brunt observes, the constitution came to operate in practice 'only in the interest of the ruling class'. 75 Reformers therefore had to use force, 'or at least to create conditions in which the senate had reason to fear its use'. 76 Thomas Africa draws attention more specifically to the importance of the Circus as a venue for public dissent. 'The Roman commons could only petition the emperor through mass demonstrations,' he explains. 'If he failed to heed their demands, they sometimes resorted to violence'. 77 Consequently, 'most emperors were receptive to public opinion as represented by the multitude in the Circus'. 78 Likewise, in the early Republic, before the tribunes were established to protect the plebeians, urban violence was the means of last resort; the only remaining point of leverage in the Conflict of the Orders. In Coriolanus, Shakespeare dramatizes this period of transition. The people 'vented their complainings', Martius explains, and a 'petition' was granted them, 'a strange one, / To break the heart of generosity / And make bold power look pale' (1.1.205-7).
The concession turns out to be 'Five tribunes to defend their vulgar wisdoms, / Of their own choice' (1.1.210-11).
Understanding riot and rebellion as a reaction against alienation helps to make sense of Jack Cade's and his companions' murderous opposition to literacy. In a well-known line, Dick the Butcher declares that the first thing the rebels will do is 'kill all the lawyers' Rouge, where supposed intellectuals were put to death for little more than, for instance, being known to use reading glasses. 79 Even if horrifying, however, the rebellion's impulse to kill all the literate is more than merely 'gross and miserable ignorance' (4.2.158), as Stafford describes it. The commons are angry because they feel that their inability to read and write unfairly excludes them from full and equal participation in the political process. They are in the dark, estranged from their own state; poverty cuts them off from the intellectual capital they need even to understand the law, much less to manipulate it in their own interest. successfully pleaded benefit of clergy in this manner. 81 It is this kind of unfair practice, then, which prompts Shakespeare's peasants' hatred here of the literate.
For the common people of Shakespeare's England, violent agitation is a means to register political opposition, when all other efforts at participation in their own governance seem futile. Earlier in the play, before Cade's revolt, the commons demand that the Duke of Suffolk 'straight be done to death, / Or banished fair England's territories'. 'An answer from the King', comes the shout, 'or we will all break in!' (3.2.244-5, 278) The king professes that he already purposed to act 'as they do entreat'; nonetheless, Suffolk's banishment does seem to require their final push. As the commoners' army faces the Staffords', Cade assures Dick that 'then are we in order when we are most out of order' (4.2.178-9). The comment could easily come across as a passing joke, but it pierces to the heart of the matter: it is precisely in disorder that the commons are most effective politically. They enter the theatre of political authority -the realm of order -only when they rebel.
8: The Language of the 'Educated Middle Class'
In his Politics, Hegel expresses some concern about the language of the 'educated middle class', that is, the class which tends to become civil servants. Coriolanus. The play opens with the plebeians in arms, demanding lower food prices: 'corn at their own rates' (1.1.183). In responding to this riot, both aristocrats want the same objective result, the status quo. Coriolanus, however, badly botches the subjective diplomacy necessary to maintain it. Menenius is the first to address the angry mob, and he is immediately wellreceived, welcomed by the rioters as 'one that hath always loved the people' (1. 'Now let it work,' he says, in an aside; 'Mischief, thou art afoot' (3.2.251). His populism is disingenuous. Antony uses the promises in Caesar's will, the money and the land which he claims Caesar grants to the people, as a means to provoke a riot; the very next scene, however, shows him scheming 'how to cut off some charge in [these] legacies' (4.1.9).
Nevertheless, his methods are effective. By stepping down from the rostrum and mixing with the people, speaking to them in their own fashion, Antony is able to manipulate them to his own ends. Like Henry V, he understands the importance of 'the common touch'.
The Monarch at War
Like most of his contemporaries, Shakespeare seems to be in favour of the classical ideal of 'mixed government' popularized by Polybius and Cicero, one which combines monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. 87 What need, however, of a king? Shakespeare, like
Hegel, seems to see the active presence of a hereditary monarch as a binding influence, crucial to forestalling the subjective alienation of the poor. 88 In defence of monarchy, Hegel argues that 'without its monarch and that articulation of the whole which is necessarily and immediately associated with monarchy, the people is a formless mass' (PR §279R). In other words, a people without a king is effectively a rabble. The monarch is the state personified:
'the actual unity of the state' (PR §281). Shakespeare for his part suggests such a role for the monarch in the pointed contrast that he draws between Henry V and his son, Henry VI. In . 90 The connection is not altogether implausible; Hegel is known to have had a 'conversant' knowledge of Shakespeare's works, even composing an alternative version of a scene from Julius Caesar when he was a teenager. 91 Wars of foreign conquest are not much to our taste today; to Shakespeare, however, as well as Hegel, they seem to have been preferable to civil war at home.
Conclusion
In sum, Shakespeare, like Hegel, seems to favour the kind of mixed government 
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